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FURTHER LIGHT ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW*

In Alabama
The Legislature of Alabama passed an Act regulating
and defining the practice of law, approved July 20, 1931.
It is interesting to note that the practice of law by individuals and collection and adjustment agencies and bureaus
in that line of business, is covered by paragraph (d) of Section 2 of the Act which reads as follows: "Whoever * * *
(d)
As a vocation, enforces, secures, settles, adjusts or compromises
defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims or demands between
persons with neither of whom he is in privity or in the relation of employer
and employee in the ordinary sense; is Practicing Law."

On May 26, 1932, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in excluding
and prohibiting Bernard Berk, a collection agent, from the
practice of law in the collection business until he has become
a lawyer. (State of Alabama, ex rel, R. Dupont Thompson
vs. Bernard Berk.)
In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court held that
it is the practice of law per se whenever the collection agent
as a vocation solicits for adjustment, collection or compromise of defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims
or demands, he not being at that time an employee in the ordinary sense of the holder of the claim, and in the handling of
such claim the collector threatens suit, collects collection fees
from the debtor, or whenever in his judgment expedient he
turns over to his attorney his claim for prosecution in court.
The Act of the Legislature above referred to is specific in
including the Justice of the Peace Court as a tribunal where
one may not practice law unless licensed so to do.
*By

Roy 0. SAMsoN, of the Denver Bar.

284

DICTA
In Washington

Sager Stanley was a resident of Woodland, Cowlitz
County, Washington. He was a notary public and a licensed
and bonded real estate agent and broker. He had
"engaged in the business of drawing various instruments for compensation,
prepared community property agreements for compensation, and in connection with the preparation of such instruments he advised clients that upon the
death of one of the parties to the agreement the property would accrue to the
other without the necessity of probating the estate. He had drawn wills for
compensation and had been paid for drawing many warranty and quitclaim
deeds. If the clients did not know what kind of a deed they wanted, he
advised them of the different kinds. He prepared claims of lien for others
and gave advice as to the place and time they should be filed and upon whom
and when they should be served. He also drew conditional sales contracts,
informed clients under what conditions the property was being sold and the
respective rights of the parties. He advised clients of the necessity, time and
place of filing chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts. He drew
other contracts for compensation.
He believed he had the right to draw
articles of incorporation and would do it for compensation. He gave legal
advice for nothing."

Stanley was thereafter made defendant in a suit to enjoin
him from practice of law without a license. The superior
court of Cowlitz County found that the conduct of the defendant in so carrying on his business was practicing law, and
enjoined him therefrom.
The decree of the court, however, was without prejudice
to the right of the defendant so long as he remained a duly
authorized Notary Public to take acknowledgments and affidavits and to do the necessary scrivener work in connection
therewith and to draw up simple deeds, simple mortgages and
simple contracts and similar simple instruments.
An appeal was taken from that portion of the decree and
the Supreme Court held that in view of the proof that Stanley
was giving legal advice, the trial court erred in holding that
the decree should be without prejudice to his right to draw
simple deeds, simple mortgages, simple contracts and similar
simple instruments and that that portion of the decree from
which appellant had appealed was erroneous and should not
have been embodied therein, and the case was remanded with
instructions to modify the decree in accordance with the
opinion. (Paul et al vs. Stanley, 12 Pacific (2nd) 401.)
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In Oklahoma
Oklahoma seeks an interpretation of the practice of law
by collection agencies and presents the following situation:
"A corporation was organized as a so-called Credit Exchange, for the
purpose of furnishing its stockholders or members with credit information and
collection service. It secures its business from its members and solicits business houses, professional men and others, who have accounts to be collected,
to become stockholders or "members." It does a very large collection business
and, when ordinary methods of collection fail, secures permission from the
creditor to start suit. The suit is started in a municipal court of inferior
jurisdiction by employees who are not lawyers, who file the necessary pleadings, and where there is no appearance, take default judgments.
This Credit Exchange retains a firm of attorneys, who furnish it general
advice, attend to its corporate matters, draft forms for it, and attend to the
general legal work that comes up in connection with the operation and conduct
of its business.
If there is an appearance in the cases which the Credit Exchange has
sued, the matter is set for trial and the firm of attorneys is engaged to handle
the contested case and secure judgment. These attorneys bill the exchange
for their services in each case, the amount of which bill is added to the charge
made to the client by the exchange."

The question is presented as to whether the attorneys may
properly accept employment to try these contested cases, or
whether their employment by such a lay intermediary, who
solicits business for itself (and, indirectly, for these lawyers)
is prohibited by Canon 35. It is argued that the lawyers are
not assisting the Credit Exchange to practice law, because it
is contended that the work done by the credit exchanges and

its lay employees, in preparing the pleadings, filing suit, etc.,
in the municipal court, is not practicing law. In support of
this position it refers to an opinion of the attorney-general of
the state, who holds that one may practice in the municipal
court in question without being a duly licensed attorney,
though that opinion admits that the question had not been
directly passed upon by the supreme court of the state.

A lawyer is rendering professional services, when he tries
an -action in a court of law irrespective of whether or not the
statutory law governing that particular court prohibits any
one, other than lawyers and litigants, from conducting such
trials.

The conduct described in the question states a clear case
of the professional services of a lawyer being controlled and
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exploited by a lay agency and such conduct is contrary to
Canon 35. The express exemption from condemnation in
Canon 35 of "The established custom of receiving commercial
collections through a lay agency" has no application since an
actual trial in a "court of law" is not a "commercial collection," even though the subject matter of such trial may be the
same as that of an attempted commercial collection.
In addition the committee is of the opinion that the institution of suits on behalf of others in any court of law is "practicing law," irrespective of whether the statutory law governing that particular court prohibits the institution of such suits
by persons other than lawyers or not. Lawyers should not aid
or participate in any way in the practice of law by laymen or
lay agencies, nor should they in any way sanction the same or
profit therefrom. The conduct described in the question is
improper, for the attorneys, by their actions, are fostering the
practice of law by a lay agency, as well as aiding therein and
profiting therefrom.
(From opinions of Committee of American Bar Association on Professional Ethics: Okla. State Bar Journal, June,
1932.)
In Massachusetts-Judiciaryvs. Legislative Control
On March 29, 1932, the Massachusetts State Senate submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court of that state certain
questions relating to a bill dealing with the admission of persons to practice law. In answer to the Senate the court stated
among other things:
"There is nothing in the Constitution, either in terms or by implication, to
indicate an intent that the power of the judiciary over the admission of persons
to become attorneys is subject to legislative control. . . . The inherent jurisdiction of the judicial department over attorneys, although recognized by
statute, is nevertheless inherent and exists without a statute. . . . Numerous
statutes have been passed making provision in aid of the judicial department
in reaching a proper selection of those qualified for ad mission as attorneys to
practice in the courts. . . . They have been enacted to enable the courts to
perform their duties. They have been enacted, also, in the exercise of the
police power to protect the public from those lacking in ability, falling short
in learning, or deficient in moral qualities, and thus incapable of maintaining
the high standard of conduct justly to be expected of members of the bar. . ..
Statutes respecting admissions to the bar, which afford appropriate instrumentalities for the ascertainment of qualifications of applicants, are no encroach-
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ment on the judicial department. They are convenient, if not essential ...
When and so far as statutes specify qualifications and accomplishments, they
will be regarded as fixing the minimum and not as setting bounds beyond
which the judicial department cannot go ... 1'

In Colorado
"It is elementary that a corporation can only appear by an attorney. A
corporation is incapable of personal appearance. . . . A wise public policy
has uniformly maintained these or similar statutory provisions regulating the
practice of law for the protection of citizens and litigants in the administration
of justice, against the mistakes of the ignorant, on the one hand, and the
machinations of unscrupulous persons, on the other, and as long as these
salutary provisions remain as the law of the state for our guidance, we cannot
allow an action to be commenced and prosecuted through the courts by one
who is denied the privilege of an attorney and counselor at law." (Bennie
vs. Triangle Ranch Company, 73 Colorado @ 588.)

It is the opinion of the writer, however, that in all of
these collection agency situations, where the attorney is a salaried employee of the agency, it is not possible to reach a point
where the attorney can divest himself of his relation of paid
employee and assume his character of the disinterested attorney and counselor. The agency practices law when it pays
an employee to perform legal services on its behalf and for
its direct pecuniary benefit, and the role of paid employee or
agent cannot be discarded as a matter of convenience.
In General

A recent publication by Frederick C. Hicks, Professor
of Law, Yale University, "Organization and Ethics of Bench
and Bar," contains a very complete resume of cases dealing
with the unauthorized practice of law. More than twentyfive pages are devoted to the subject and reference is made
to cases in California, New York, Tennessee, Georgia and
Illinois, with a great number of additional cases cited.
Make the most of yourself, for that is all there is of you.-Emerson.
The function of culture is not merely to train the powers of enjoyment,
but first and supremely for helpful service.-Bishop Potter.
Be a life long or short, its completeness depends on what it was lived
for.-David Starr Jordan.

July 20, 1932.
Mr. Hamlet J. Barry,
Chairman of the Special Committee of the Denver Bar
Association on Elimination of Unnecessary Delay
in Procedure,
904 Equitable Building,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Mr. Barry:Your letter under date of March 30, 1932, addressed to
me, was duly received and contents noted, together with the
report of your special committee, consisting of Kenneth
Robinson, Carle Whitehead, Bentley McMullin, Louis A.
Hellerstein and yourself, as Chairman, also the minority
report signed by Carle Whitehead.
The said report was presented by me to the next meeting
of the Judges en banc, considered and discussed at some
length, and the matter was held over for further consideration.
I further call your attention to the fact that the articles referred to under paragraph 5(c) by Carle Whitehead, Esq.,
in collaboration with Albert L. Vogl, Esq., appearing in the
January issue of "Dicta" on page 76, and also the article by
Hudson Moore of the Denver Bar, appearing in the March
issue of "Dicta" on page 129, were also considered and the
matter came on for further consideration before the Court en
banc on the 14th day of April, 1932.
I wish to express to you and each member of the Committee, also to Mr. Albert L. Vogl and Mr. Hudson Moore,
the appreciation of the Court for your manifest and painstaking care in preparing this report and these articles, which
have been carefully considered and given the attention they
deserve. However, after consideration of the subject, the
Court en banc was unanimously of the opinion that the practice as laid down by our Code of Civil Procedure and the
Rules of Practice of the District Court of this district, as
heretofore printed and revised to date, are better-all things
considered-than the changes suggested.
Among the reasons spoken of by one or more of the
Judges, are as follows:
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1. In our opinion, there is no needless delay at the present time in civil trials resulting from the filing of successive
motions and demurrers. Such motions and demurrers can be
promptly noticed for hearing and heard with the result that
notwithstanding the great majority of them are overruled as
not well taken, but nevertheless, the argument, discussion and
citation of authority usually results in a better understanding
of the case by Court and counsel.
2. The point should not be overlooked that some reasonable delay in getting to issue is not, on the whole, time lost as
it gives litigants an opportunity to consult with their respective counsel, and through them, with each other, with the result that, on the whole, the records of the Court show that
many times as many cases are settled amicably and compromised after suit has been filed than are actually contested.
3. Referring particularly to the so-called "Single Calendar System" as contrasted with the "Multiple System", as
referred to in Mr. Hudson Moore's said article, it is said
among other things on page 132 that "The stock objection to
the Single Calendar System is that a judge who hears, a motion
or demurrer is best qualified to try all issues in the case". The
consensus of opinion of the Court en banc was that that objection as applied to this Court under present conditions is well
taken.
4. In connection with the foregoing, it may be that the
"Single Calendar System" may work very satisfactorily in
some jurisdictions where they have a greater volume of business, and a greater number of judges, such as Chicago, Illinois
or Los Angeles, California, but we understand from hearsay,
through attorneys and other information, that those courts
that operate under this "Single Calendar System" are much
farther behind with the dispatch of their business relatively,
than this Court.
5. We are unanimously of the opinion, after checking
ov.er our dockets and records of the Clerk's Office, that there
is no "needless delay" in getting cases at issue and trial where
the attorneys in the cases avail themselves of their right and
privilege to promptly move for the setting and hearing of
each motion and demurrer as soon as it is filed, and promptly
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moving for setting the case for trial to court or jury as soon
as the case is at issue.
6. Among the objections considered by the Judges en
banc to the "Single Calendar System" is the fact that that
would entirely eradicate and change our system of assigning
of cases to different Divisions in open Court by lot, as provided by Rule 2 of the Court Rules, which in our opinioly is
working very satisfactorily, both to Court and counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. F. DUNKLEE,

Presiding Judge of the
District Court.

AN APOLOGY
Dicta regrets that in the last issue the author of the article
entitled "New Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932 Relative
to Federal Income Taxes" was noted as "Arthur J. Lindsay"
instead of "Alexander J. Lindsay," who was the writer of the
same.
DICTA DISSERTATIONS
Our destiny is our own
trembling-in our own way.
controlling question must be:
men; if nay, have done with
McKinley.

and it must be worked out-perhaps in fear and
If there be a cherished American doctrine the
Is it right? If yea, then let us stand by it like
it and move forward to other issues.-William

Let us not concern ourselves about how other men will do their duties,
but concern ourselves about how we shall do ours.-Lyman Abbott.
However good you may be you have faults; however dull you may be
you can find out what some of them are, and however slight they may be you
had better make some-not too painful, but patient efforts to get rid of
them.-Ruskin.
You are either a magnet that attracts all things bright, desirable, healthy
and joyous--or one that draws all things disagreeable, gloomy, unhealthy and
destructive.-Quigley.

